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THE PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF
FORCE FOR ARMS CONTROL:
THE CASE OF IRAN’S NUCLEAR
PROGRAM
Mary Ellen O’Connell and Reyam El Molla*
In many discussions of Iran’s nuclear program, there seems
to be an implicit assumption that states have a right to use military
force to end the program. For example, the Institute for National
Security Studies,1 an Israeli think tank, in an article titled, The Legality
of an Attack against Iranian Nuclear Facilities, places emphasis on
proving the necessity of an attack as a last resort but fails to indicate
any accepted legal basis for resort to military force as an initial
matter.2 In fact, international law does not permit the use of military
force without United Nations Security Council authorization for
arms control of any kind, whether to end a nuclear program, to end a
chemical weapons program, or to prevent missile shipments.

* Mary Ellen O’Connell, Robert and Marion Short Professor of Law and
Research Professor of International Dispute Resolution, University of Notre Dame
Law School, and Reyam El Molla, LL.M., University of Notre Dame Law School,
2012, human rights lawyer, Cairo, Egypt.
1 See INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES,
http://www.inss.org.il (last visited Aug. 29, 2013).
2 Robbie Sabel, The Legality of an Attack against Iranian Nuclear Facilities, 345
INSS INSIGHT 1 (2012),
http://www.inss.org.il.cdn.reblaze.com/upload/(FILE)1339738543.pdf.
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INTERNATIONAL LAW ON THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE
At the very heart of the international legal system is Article
2(4) of the United Nations Charter.3 Article 2(4) generally prohibits
the use of military force in international relations. It has only two
express exceptions in the Charter and one implied exception in
general international law. Expressly, states may use force under the
terms of Article 51 in self-defense if an armed attack occurs.4 States
may also use force if the U.N. Security Council authorizes it.5 Finally,
some argue that, under customary international law, a state may use
military force when invited by a government to assist in ending an
insurgency.6 In 2001, the United States took the position that
Afghanistan’s Taliban government was legally responsible for actions
by Al Qaeda so that, under the law of self-defense, the United States
had the right to use military force in Afghanistan following the 9/11
attacks. The use of force in self-defense in Afghanistan, however,
ended in 2002 when a loya jirga of prominent Afghans selected Hamid

3 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 states: “All Members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity
or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
Purposes of the United Nations.”
4 U.N. Charter art. 51 states: “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair
the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by
Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported
to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and
responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time
such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace
and security.”
5 U.N. Charter art. 39 states: “The Security Council shall determine the
existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and
shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance
with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.”
Articles 41 and 42 state in part: “The Security Council may decide what measures
not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its
decisions . . . .[I]t may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be
necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security . . . .”
6 See Louise Doswald-Beck, The Legal Validity of Military Intervention by
Invitation of the Government, 56 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 189, 191-92 (1986),
http://bybil.oxfordjournals.org/content/56/1/189.full.pdf+html.
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Karzai to be Afghanistan’s leader.7 Since then the U.S. has been
fighting at the invitation of President Karzai.
Despite the fact that many in U.S. international security
circles overlook these legal obligations, they remain the law. In 2005,
the United Nations Charter provisions on the use of force were
reconfirmed by all U.N. member states at the World Summit in New
York. In 2010, states provided another show of support for Article
2(4) when a definition of the crime of aggression was formally added
to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (I.C.C.).8 In
adding to the I.C.C.’s jurisdiction, the 122 states party to the Rome
Statute indirectly confirmed their support for Article 2(4). Any
serious violation of Article 2(4) is an act of aggression for which a
national leader could face individual criminal responsibility.9
Even where a state has a right to use force based on selfdefense, Security Council authorization, or invitation, the state
resorting to force must also comply with any applicable rules of state
responsibility,10 as well as the general principles of necessity11 and

7 See Carlotta Gall & James Dao, A Buoyant Karzai Is Sworn In as
Afghanistan’s Leader, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2002,
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/20/world/a-buoyant-karzai-is-sworn-in-asafghanistan-s-leader.html. See also Mary Ellen O’Connell, Remarks: The Resort to
Drones under International Law, 39 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 585, 592 (2011).
8 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 37
I.L.M. 999,
http://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/UNTS/Volume%202187/v2187.pdf.
9 See Amendments to the Rome Statute on the International Criminal
Court, Jun. 11, 2010, C.N.651.2010.TREATIES-8 (Depositary Notification),
http://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/CN/2010/CN.651.2010-Eng.pdf. See also
Mary Ellen O’Connell & Mirakmal Niyazmatov, What is Aggression? Comparing the Jus
Ad Bellum and the ICC Statute, 10 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 189 (2012).
10 On the law of state responsibility generally, see G.A. Res. 56/83, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/56/83 (Jan. 28, 2002),
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/56/83&Lang=
E and G.A. Res. 56/49, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/49 (Jan. 22, 2002),
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/56/49&Lang=
E. See also JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION’S ARTICLES
ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY: INTRODUCTION, TEXT AND COMMENTARIES (2002).
11 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion,
1996 I.C.J. 226 (July 8) [hereinafter Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
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proportionality.12 Given these restrictions on the right to resort to
force, the Israeli scholar Yoram Dinstein is correct when he says,
“U.N. member states are barred by the Charter from exercising selfdefense in response to a mere threat of force.”13 The possession or
development of weapons, even weapons of mass destruction, cannot
be classified as anything more than a threat.
APPLYING THE RULES ON THE USE OF FORCE TO
ATTACKING IRAN
Soon after the adoption of the U.N. Charter, it might have
been conceivable that the world would classify the possession of
nuclear weapons as more than a threat. Such possession could have
been deemed in law to be an armed attack. While conceivable, the
plain fact is that the world has not concluded that the development
or possession of nuclear weapons is the equivalent of an armed
attack.
Many experts suspect that Iran is intent on developing
nuclear weapons. Concerns have existed for many years, but were
heightened in April 2013 when Iran announced that it planned to
install advanced centrifuges and a production unit at Natanz.14 A
February 13, 2013 report published by the Wisconsin Project’s Iran
Watch,15 estimates, on the basis of data supplied by the International
Weapons]. See also Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua
(Nicar. v. U.S.) 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua].
12 See Nicaragua, supra note 11, at ¶ 176 (noting the requirements under
customary international law of necessity and proportionality when using selfdefense). See also Georg Nolte, Multipurpose Self-Defence, Proportionality Disoriented: A
Response to David Kretzmer, 24 EUR. J. INT’L L. 283 (2013).
13 YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 199,
para. 525 (5th ed. 2011).
14 See Yeganeh Torbati & Fredrik Dahl, Iran Announces Uranium Mining
After Nuclear Talks Fail, REUTERS, Apr. 9, 2013,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/09/us-iran-nuclearidUSBRE93804L20130409.
15 See Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, About Iran Watch,
IRAN WATCH, http://www.iranwatch.org/about-us (last visited Aug. 29, 2013)
(“The Wisconsin Project carries out research and public education designed to stop
the spread of nuclear weapons, chemical/biological weapons and long-range
missiles.”).
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Atomic Energy Agency, that “[b]y using the approximately 9,000
centrifuges operating at its Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant, Iran could
theoretically produce enough weapon-grade uranium to fuel a single
nuclear warhead in about 1.5 months.”16 Iran denies that it is
developing nuclear weapons; it claims to be developing a domestic
power source.17 With respect to resort to military force, however,
neither the development nor the possession of nuclear weapons is
classified as an armed attack sufficient to trigger the right of selfdefense under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.
In its 1996 advisory opinion, the Legality of the Threat or the Use
of Nuclear Weapons, the International Court of Justice said this about
the possession of nuclear weapons:
It does not seem to the Court that the use of nuclear
weapons can be regarded as specifically prohibited on
the basis of certain provisions of the Second Hague
Declaration of 1899, the Regulations annexed to The
Hague Convention IV of 1907 or the 1925 Geneva
Protocol. The pattern until now has been for
weapons of mass destruction to be declared illegal by
specific instruments. But the Court does not find any
specific prohibition of recourse to nuclear weapons in
treaties expressly prohibiting the use of certain
weapons of mass destruction; and observes that,
although, in the last two decades, a great many
negotiations have been conducted regarding nuclear
weapons, they have not resulted in a treaty of general

Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, Iran’s Nuclear Timetable,
IRAN WATCH (May 24, 2013),
http://www.iranwatch.org/ourpubs/articles/iranucleartimetable.html. See also Iran
‘has tripled’ uranium-enriching centrifuges at Natanz plant, RT NEWS (published Apr. 17,
2013, 19:54), http://rt.com/news/iran-nuclear-centrifuges-natanz-016/.
17 See Islamic Republic of Iran Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Basic Facts
About Iran’s Peaceful Nuclear Activities, THE EMBASSY OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF
IRAN IN OSLO, http://iranembassy.no/en/6.htm (last visited Aug. 29, 2013)
(discussing the Report issued by the Iranian Embassy in Oslo regarding the reality
of Iran’s nuclear program).
16
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prohibition of the same kind as for bacteriological
and chemical weapons.18
If the Security Council were to authorize the use of force to
stop Iran’s nuclear program, states using force would not need to
prove that development or possession of nuclear weapons amounted
to an armed attack. These states would have to show, however, that
using force would be a last resort and could succeed in ending Iran’s
program or possession of weapons.19 The International Court of
Justice in its 2003 Oil Platforms case, brought by Iran against the
United States for unlawful attacks, said:
[I]n order to establish that it was legally justified in
attacking the Iranian platforms in exercise of the right
of individual self-defence, the United States has to
show that attacks had been made upon it for which
Iran was responsible; and that those attacks were of
such a nature as to be qualified as “armed attacks”
within the meaning of that expression in Article 51 of
the United Nations Charter, and as understood in
customary law on the use of force. As the Court
observed in the case concerning Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, it is
necessary to distinguish “the most grave forms of the
use of force (those constituting an armed attack) from
other less grave forms,” since “[i]n the case of
individual self-defence, the exercise of this right is
subject to the State concerned having been the victim
of an armed attack.”20
Moreover, the states using force would need to show that the
cost of using force—in terms of persons killed and property
18 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 11, at ¶¶
49-73 (discussing rules on the lawfulness or unlawfulness of nuclear weapons as
such).
19 See Mary Ellen O’Connell & Maria Alevras-Chen, The Ban On the Bomband Bombing: Iran, the U.S., and the International Law of Self-Defense, 57 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 497, 509-13 (2007).
20 Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161, ¶ 51 (Nov. 6) (quoting, in
part, Nicaragua, supra note 11, at ¶¶ 191, 195).
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destroyed—did not outweigh the value of the military objective.
When a state resorts to the use of force, especially in populated areas,
it should be limited to the minimum force needed to accomplish the
military objective without the loss of life.
Israel has used military force on several occasions to control
weapons developments and shipments. It attacked Iraq in 1981,
Sudan in 2009, Syria in September 2007 and again in January and May
2013.21 In the 2007 Syrian case, Israel sent eight fighter jets to bomb a
factory site. Allegedly, Syria was cooperating with North Korea in the
construction of a secret weapons production facility. It was only days
after the bombing that Syria protested. Syria likely did not protest
sooner because it did not wish to draw attention to its illicit
activities.22 The situation could be analogized to an unclean hands
finding—courts will not hear the claims of a plaintiff when the
plaintiff has committed a wrong of its own in the matter. Despite the
muted protests, the 2007 incident did not result in any change to the
binding terms of the U.N. Charter prohibiting the use of force. Other
attacks by Israel have resulted in greater levels of criticism and
condemnation.
In addition to the lack of legal basis to attack a state for arms
control purposes, any attack on Iran would likely fail to meet the
requirements of necessity and proportionality. While some speculate
that attacking Iran could end the nuclear program, plenty of experts
doubt this outcome and even speculate that attacking Iran will induce
the Iranians to accelerate the program or divert it from energy
production to weapons production.23 Moreover, any use of military
force in Iran will result in widespread death, injury, and destruction.24
It is well known that the nuclear sites are scattered throughout the
See Timeline: Israeli attacks on Syrian targets, AL JAZEERA (last modified
May 5, 2013, 17:53),
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/05/20135512739431489.html.
22 See Mary Ellen O’Connell, Affirming the Ban on Bombing Iran, SYRACUSE
L. REV. (2012), http://www.law.syr.edu/student-life/publications/law-review/irannuclear-symposium/mary-ellen-oconnell.aspx.
23 See Attacking or Threatening Iran Makes No Sense (Key Points), AMERICAN
FOREIGN POLICY PROJECT, http://americanforeignpolicy.org/military-optioniran/attacking-iran (last visited Aug. 29, 2013).
24 Id.
21
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country and are underground with people living near areas that might
be affected. Further, attacking Iran in these circumstances would
result in giving Iran the right to counter-attack. Other states would
have the legal right to come to its aid in collective self-defense.
Attacking Iran could result in yet another destructive war in Western
Asia and the Middle East, even as the Iraq War drags on, and
instability and violence plague nations in the midst of the transition
known as the Arab Spring.
MEASURES SHORT OF FORCE AGAINST IRAN’S NUCLEAR
PROGRAM
What about measures short of the use of armed force such as
economic sanctions or cyberattacks such as the Stuxnet worm? Such
measures are prohibited in the first instance under the principle of
non-intervention but could be permissible if imposed by the U.N.
Security Council or as countermeasures if the conditions for
countermeasures are met.
The United Nations Security Council has imposed sanctions
on Iran, and these are generally lawful.25 The United States and the
European Union, however, have more questionable sanctions
programs in place.26 The United States and Israel have also,
apparently, used a computer virus to attack Iran, which is difficult to
justify under international law.27 Stuxnet caused centrifuges in Iran’s
25 See Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Imposes
Sanctions on Iran for Failure to Halt Uranium Enrichment, Unanimously Adopting
Resolution 1737 (2006), U.N. Press Release SC/8928 (Dec. 23, 2006),
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8928.doc.htm. See also Press
Release, Security Council, Security Council Imposes Additional Sanctions on Iran,
Voting 12 in Favour to 2 Against, with 1 Abstention, U.N. Press Release SC/9948
(June 9, 2010) (adopting Security Council Resolution 1929 (2010)),
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/sc9948.doc.htm.
26 See Reuters, U.S. senators seek to block Iran from billion-dollar reserves, AL
ARABIYA (last updated May 9, 2013, KSA 09:02–GMT 06:02),
http://english.alarabiya.net/en/business/economy/2013/05/09/US-senatorsseek-to-block-Iran-from-billion-dollar-reserves.html.
27 For a good account of the possible involvement of the U.S. and Israel
in the use of the Stuxnet worm against Iran, see DAVID E. SANGER, CONFRONT
AND CONCEAL: OBAMA’S SECRET WARS AND SURPRISING USE OF AMERICAN
POWER 197-209 (2012).
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nuclear facilities to turn far more rapidly than appropriate.28 As will
be discussed below, to be lawful, Stuxnet, like unilateral economic
sanctions, would have to meet the rules governing countermeasures.
Both attempts to pressure Iran fall short of those rules.
Countermeasures are mechanisms allowed under international
law for states to carry out self-help, coercive enforcement of their
rights. Self-help plays a larger role in international law enforcement
given the absence at the international level of both a central police
force and compulsory judicial body. In the Gabčikovo- Nagymaros
case,29 the International Court of Justice laid down four elements of a
lawful countermeasure:
In the first place it must be taken in response
to a previous international wrongful act of another
State and must be directed against that State. . . .
. . . [T]he injured State must have called upon
the State committing the wrongful act to discontinue
its wrongful conduct or to make reparation for it. . . .
. . . [T]he effects of a countermeasure must be
commensurate with the injury suffered, taking
account of the rights in question. . . .
....
. . . [I]ts purpose must be to induce the
wrongdoing state to comply with its obligations under
international law, and the measure must therefore be
reversible.30
If a state is a victim of an international law violation and it
has clear and convincing evidence that the wrongful act is attributable
to a foreign sovereign state, the victim state may itself commit a
wrong, so long as it is commensurate with the initial wrongful act
See id. See also Mary Ellen O’Connell, Cyber Security Without Cyber War,
17 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L.187, 194 (2012).
29 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slov.), 1997 I.C.J. 7 (Sept. 25).
30 Id. at ¶¶ 83-87.
28
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(proportionality) and the response is aimed at inducing an end to the
initial wrong (necessity) or the provision of damages. In the Stuxnet
case, if the United States and Israel released the worm, they are the
states that committed the wrong, not Iran.31 Therefore, it was an
unlawful, disproportionate countermeasure because forty percent of
the computers it affected were not in Iran. Moreover, the worm has
been reverse-engineered and is now a weapon in the hands of
criminals. Finally, the worm could not have been intended to prevent
the wrongdoing.
The Security Council has the right to impose sanctions on
Iran as it has for many years, but the U.S. does not have the right to
act unilaterally beyond discretionary areas of activity, such as the
provision of aid. Imposing sanctions on individuals, corporations, or
states that do not adhere to unilateral U.S. demands violates a variety
of international legal principles, inter alia, due process, property rights
of individuals, and the principle of non-intervention in the case of
interference with sovereign state activities. It is important to draw a
distinction between Security Council sanctions and unilateral
sanctions by individual states because the former’s purpose is to
modify behavior, not punish; whereas, the latter seeks to punish
states and to compel them to act in a certain manner. A unilateral
sanction would not only be unlawful, but also inefficient in Iran’s
case as it will hamper a diplomatic resolution to the situation. The
U.S. recently targeted companies that are accused of evading
sanctions imposed on Iran, and according to some reports, imposed
financial penalties “on an Iranian businessman, a Malaysian bank and
a network of companies it accused of attempting to evade

The one wrong that Iran has committed is failure to comply with
Security Council resolutions against it. The Security Council has not authorized the
U.S. and Israel to take measures to respond to that wrong. The U.S. and Israel
claim Iran has violated an International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards
agreement. Again, even if that is correct, the Security Council is addressing Iran’s
nuclear activities, meaning the U.S and Israel have no independent right to take
enforcement action unilaterally. See S.C. Res. 1696, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1696 (July
31, 2006); S.C. Res. 1737, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1737 (Dec. 23, 2006); S.C. Res. 1747,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1747 (Mar. 24, 2007); S.C. Res. 1803, U.N. Doc. S/RES/ 1803
(Mar. 3, 2008); S.C. Res. 1835, U.N. Doc. S/RES/ 1835 (Sept. 27, 2008); S.C. Res.
1929, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1929 (June 9, 2010).
31
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international sanctions on Iran’s nuclear program through money
laundering.”32
Flynt Leverett has assessed U.S. sanctions against Iran,
concluding:
I’ve had any number of Iranians, official and
otherwise, say this to me—that sanctions, in some
ways, actually help Iran, in that they give the
government a kind of political cover to take some
steps toward what you might call economic reform,
that would be politically difficult otherwise. . . .Iran
has done more to expand non-oil exports, it is less
dependent on oil revenues for both its government
budget and to cover its imports, than any other major
oil-exporting country in the Middle East. It has done
far more in that kind of diversification than Saudi
Arabia or any of the states on the other side of the
Persian Gulf . . .33
Obviously, imposing new economic and diplomatic sanctions
will not stop Iran from continuing its nuclear plans. On the contrary,
sanctions will only make negotiations more difficult and could make
Iran more determined not to comply with U.S.-Israeli demands. With
the election of a new Iranian president in mid-2013, Iran indicated a
renewed interest in good faith negotiations and greater transparency
in disclosing information about its nuclear programs.34

Timothy Gardner, U.S. targets companies accused of evading Iran sanctions,
REUTERS, Apr. 11 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/12/us-usa-iransanctions-idUSBRE93A16Z20130412.
33 Flynt Leverett, The Strategic And Moral Bankruptcy of U.S. Sanctions Policy
Toward Iran–Flynt Leverett and Trita Parsi on HuffPost Live, GOING TO TEHRAN
(posted April 16, 2013), http://goingtotehran.com/the-strategic-and-moralbankruptcy-of-u-s-sanctions-policy-toward-iran-flynt-leverett-and-trita-parsi-onhuffpost-live.
34 Iran’s president-elect calls his election victory a mandate for change, GUARDIAN,
June 29, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/29/iran-presidentelection-victory.
32
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Russia takes the same position as Iran. According to the
Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov, “Moscow believes
that all rights of the Islamic Republic of Iran, including its right to
enrich uranium, should be recognized in exchange for its concessions
on its nuclear program.”35 Iranian Supreme leader Ayatollah Sayyid
Ali Khamenei, said in a statement that the U.S. should recognize
Iran’s right to uranium enrichment and that it should stop trying to
force them to suspend it if they want a peaceful solution.36
In the first months following the election of Iran’s President
Rouhani, the Obama administration indicated renewed interest in
achieving a diplomatic solution rather than using military action,
which is appropriate; however, it does require affirmative steps
toward negotiations. Iran says that it is also open to negotiations. In a
statement made by the Head of the Judiciary Ayatollah Sadegh Amoli
Larijani, he said that “the path for rational negotiations and rational
nuclear dialogues are open and we hope Western countries come to
their senses.”37 This may indicate Iran’s willingness to reach a
peaceful diplomatic solution without the threats from the United
States. Indeed, while talks held in Kazakhstan in April 2013 seemed
to yield no positive result,38 the logjam against talks was finally
opened. Success in achieving the elimination of Syrian chemical
weapons through peaceful means would be an encouraging example
of what is possible.
CONCLUSION
The rules of the U.N. Charter were designed to maintain
peace in the post-World War II era. No state may resort to the use of
Russia says Iran’s right to enrich uranium should be recognized in a nuclear deal,
TEHRAN TIMES (Apr. 8, 2013, 15:13),
http://www.tehrantimes.com/politics/106651-russia-says-irans-right-to-enrichuranium-should-be-recognized-in-a-nuclear-deal.
36 United States Institute of Peace, Khamenei Open to Direct U.S. Talks, THE
IRAN PRIMER (Mar. 24, 2013, 10:46 PM),
http://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2013/mar/24/khamenei-open-direct-us-talks.
37 Iran News Round Up April 10, 2013, IRAN TRACKER (Apr. 10, 2013),
http://www.irantracker.org/iran-news-round-april-10-2013.
38 See Iran nuclear talks end without progress, AL JAZEERA, Apr. 6, 2013,
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/04/2013442165893529.html.
35
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force against another state unless it is acting in individual or collective
self-defense to an actual armed attack or with Security Council
authorization. In addition, all use of force must be necessary and
proportionate. Member states of the U.N. have the responsibility to
honor the core principles of the U.N. Charter, which are to maintain
international peace and security. Attacking Iran is clearly contrary to
these obligations. In facing a situation of great concern such as the
Iranian nuclear program, Article 33 of the U.N. Charter requires that
states resolve disputes peacefully:
The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which
is likely to endanger the maintenance of international
peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by
negotiation,
enquiry,
mediation,
conciliation,
arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional
agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of
their own choice.
The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary,
call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such
means.39

39

See U.N. Charter art. 33, paras. 1-2.
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